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Re-thinking SME disadvantage in public procurement 
Purpose – This study investigates the relationship between firm size, resources, capabilities 
and involvement in public procurement. While the liability of smallness has been a recurring 
theme in research into public sector suppliers, there remains a dearth of evidence and theorising 
on the effects of size.      
Methodology – A model linking firm size, resources, capabilities, tendering activity and 
performance is devised. Resource-based View (RBV) theory informs the model. Survey data 
from over 3000 firms active in the Irish public sector marketplace is used to test the model. 
Findings – As hypothesised, firm size is positively associated with tendering resources and 
capabilities. Resources and capabilities, in turn, influence tendering activity and performance. 
Specifically, resources act as enablers for the number and value of contracts firms tender for 
while capabilities are important for winning contracts. We also find similarities between 
medium and large enterprises in their ability to tender.  
Research limitations – The treatment of tendering resources and capabilities is not exhaustive. 
Future research could include additional indicators of resources (e.g. external consultants, IT) 
and capabilities (e.g. production, process innovation).   
Practical implications – Managers of micro and small suppliers should focus on augmenting 
their tendering capabilities as they lag bigger suppliers. Legislators need to re-assess current 
“one-size-fits-all” SME-friendly policy as it is not sensitive to intra-SME differences.  
Originality/value – This study introduces an important qualification into understanding of 
public sector suppliers by demonstrating that SME disadvantage is less black and white than 
shades of grey.  
Keywords Public sector, SMEs, Tendering, Resources, Capabilities 
Paper type Research paper  
Introduction 
The liability of being a small supplier in the public sector marketplace is a cross-cutting theme 
in procurement research. Over the past 25 years numerous academic studies and government 
reports have addressed the question of why small and medium enterprises (SMEs) struggle to 
compete for and win business with public sector organisations (see Loader, 2013 for a full 
review). As a result of these studies and reports we know that public procurement is challenging 
for SMEs on multiple levels and that there are no easy solutions to their under-representation. 
Problems include not only bureaucratic tendering systems and onerous qualification criteria 
(Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2015) but also excessive risk aversion on the part of public buyers 
(Cabras, 2011) and a public sector marketplace that operates in ways unfamiliar to many small 
firms (Greer, 1999).    
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Focusing on SMEs’ difficulties has helped direct scholarly attention to the current state of the 
public sector marketplace and what needs to change to make it less skewed towards large 
enterprises (e.g. Knutsson and Thomasson, 2014; Walker and Preuss, 2008). At the same time 
it has prompted governments to reform public procurement and make it more inclusive of 
smaller and younger suppliers, as recent analysis by the OECD (2013) of its members’ 
administrative systems demonstrates. But it has also come with a downside. Barring a few 
exceptions, it has led researchers to frame the debate on public procurement as one of struggling 
SMEs versus dominant large firms (Flynn et al., 2015). The same criticism applies to 
contemporary procurement policy, which typically treats the SME cohort of the enterprise 
population as uniformly disadvantaged relative to large firms and deserving of support on this 
basis. The European Commission’s (2008) Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs 
to Public Procurement Contracts is a case in point.  
The inevitable result of defining SMEs against large firms is that the former comes to be 
depicted in monolithic terms (Pett et al., 2012). Differences within the SME population are 
downplayed and commonalities exaggerated. This phenomenon certainly characterises public 
procurement. SMEs are generally understood to be hindered by barriers that are the same in 
type and magnitude regardless of their size, age, industry, ownership structure or strategic 
positioning. What is more, SMEs are assumed to possess similar stocks of resources and 
capabilities for tendering and, by implication, achieve similar results. Yet such assumptions of 
SME homogeneity start to look suspect when one considers that SME is an umbrella term for 
micro, small and medium enterprises and accounts for 99 per cent of all business entities in the 
EU. Findings to emerge from recent studies provide further cause for scepticism. They identify 
differences between micro, small and medium enterprises in respect of their capacity to tender 
(Flynn et al., 2015; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008) and number and value of contracts 
won (PwC, 2014).  
The purpose of this study is to move beyond the SME versus large firm dichotomy by providing 
a more fine-grained analysis of the relationship between enterprise size and involvement in the 
public sector marketplace. To this end, our paper uses primary survey data from over three 
thousand suppliers to test the relationship between firm size and ability to tender for and win 
public contracts. It adds to the existing body of scholarship in two main ways. Empirically, it 
cross-compares micro, small, medium and large enterprises in respect of their resource base 
for tendering. To our knowledge, no previous study has simultaneously analysed these four 
size groups in this way. It then probes inter-relationships between the resource base and 
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indicators of tendering activity and performance. Theoretically, it takes a resource-based view 
(RBV) of firm involvement in public procurement. This too is novel and goes some way 
towards addressing the paucity of theory in research at the intersection of SMEs and public 
procurement.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two puts forward a conceptual model that links 
firm size, resource base for tendering, tendering activity and performance. The model is 
informed by RBV theory. Section three provides details on the research design. Relevant here 
is operationalisation and measurement of the variables, data collection, data screening and 
preliminary data analysis. Section four tests the conceptual model and presents the results. 
Section five discusses the import of the results in light on what is currently known about SME 
and large firm involvement in public procurement. Implications for research and practice are 
articulated. The paper concludes with an acknowledgement of its limitations as well as 
suggestions for how these can be addressed.   
Literature review 
Public procurement is a significant marketplace for private sector firms, accounting for 13% of 
GDP and 29% of government expenditure, on average, across developed economies (OECD, 
2013). In monetary terms this equates to £242 billion in the UK and approximately €1,900 
billion in the EU, to give but two illustrations. Public contracts are attractive to private sector 
firms for a number of reasons. For a start, they represent a predictable and stable source of 
demand (Loader, 2005). Payment certainty is another factor, with survey evidence showing 
this factor to be among the main perceived benefits of supplying public sector organisations 
(MacManus, 1991). Besides this, some types of public procurement provide innovative firms 
with the opportunity to commercialise new products and services (Georghiou et al., 2014). 
Against these attractions, business-to-government (B2G) is bureaucratic, legalistic and arms-
length when compared to business-to-business (B2B) (Lian and Laing, 2004). As such, it 
represents something of a double-edge sword for suppliers. 
Internationally, the evidence indicates that firm size is strongly deterministic of involvement 
in public procurement. For instance, 74 per cent of the total value of procurement spend in the 
UK went to large firms as against 26 per cent for SMEs (House of Commons Library, 2015). 
In the EU Single Market large firms had a 71 per cent share of above-threshold contracts in 
2014 while SMEs had a 29 per cent share (PwC, 2014). For large firms this is substantially 
above their gross value-added (GVA) in the EU economy and for SMEs substantially below 
their GVA. Arguably, one of the reasons for this imbalance is that larger firms have a greater 
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endowment of resources and capabilities for tendering. These resources and capabilities enable 
them to be more active and competitive in public procurement. To give theoretical weight and 
explanatory depth to this argument we turn to the RBV of the firm.   
RBV theory 
RBV as a theory explains performance in terms of bundles of resources owned or controlled 
by the firm. It views performance from the inside out and is synonymous with the work of 
Penrose (1959) and latterly Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991). Its definition of resources is 
broad, encompassing all the assets, capabilities, organisational routines and informational 
attributes of the firm that enable it to compete (Barney, 1991, p. 101). There are two 
underpinning assumptions of RBV theory (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; 
Makadok, 2001). The first is that the quantity and quality of resources owned or controlled by 
firms vary within and across industries. In other words, firms are heterogeneous as to their 
resource base. The second is that the various resource types, but particularly capabilities, are 
not always tradeable and can be organisation or context specific. Thus, the competitive 
advantage they yield for the firm becomes difficult for rivals to imitate. This can eventually 
give rise to a sustained competitive advantage.    
What does RBV theory mean for firm involvement in public procurement? At the most 
fundamental level it means that firms likely possess varying bundles of resources and 
capabilities for tendering. These resource bundles have a significant bearing on their ability to 
compete efficiently and effectively in the public sector marketplace. A firm’s complement of 
resources will, for example, affect decisions around how often to seek out and tender for 
contracts with public sector organisations, as well as the type and value of contracts to pursue. 
Reijonen et al. (2016) and Tammi et al. (2014) provide evidence of this in respect of 
entrepreneurial and market sensing resources, respectively. Moreover, resources and 
capabilities will directly impact the likelihood of succeeding in the public sector marketplace 
as regards contracts won and new revenue streams established – something which Flynn and 
Davis (2016a) demonstrated.  
In the remainder of this section we describe our conceptual model (see Figure 1). It takes firm 
size as the point of departure in explaining involvement in public procurement. Firm size is 
understood to predict the resource base for tendering. Specifically, firm size is expected to 
predict (i) human resource availability for tendering (ii) experience in tendering (iii) procedural 
capabilities and (iv) relational capabilities. The resource base for tendering is then expected to 
influence tendering activity and performance. Indicators of tendering activity are frequency of 
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tendering and the typical value of contracts tendered for. Indicators of performance are success 
rate in tendering and proportion of corporate revenue that is derived from public sector 
tendering.    
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
 
Firm size and resource base  
Findings from a number of studies indicate that firm size is deterministic of the tangible and 
intangible assets available for public sector tendering. Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008), for 
instance, found micro enterprises to have less legal expertise and administrative capacity for 
tendering than small and medium enterprises. Flynn et al. (2015) discerned a similar pattern. 
In their investigation the size of the SME was positively linked to the organisational resources 
it had at its disposal for tendering as well as its willingness to avail of procurement-related 
training. Here we expect that firm size will be positively related to four resource types germane 
to public sector tendering. These are human resource availability for tendering, tendering 
experience, procedural capability and relational capability.  
The relationship between firm size and human resource availability for tendering can be 
explained in terms of organisational slack. By organisational slack is meant the cushion of 
tangible and intangible resources that firms can draw on in response to internal pressures for 
adjustment or external pressures for change (Sharfman et al., 1988). As well as human 
resources, slack can take the form of working capital, production capacity and inventory. Large 
firms have been shown by Sharfman et al. (1988) to operate with more slack than small firms. 
The reason being that they have greater financial and physical capacity to hold additional 
resources. In the context of public procurement, this means that larger firms are able to deploy 
more staff to respond to requests for tender (RFT) and to pursue business development 
opportunities with public sector organisations as they arise. Thus, we offer the following 
hypothesis. 
H1a.  There is a positive relationship between firm size and human resource availability for 
tendering.  
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Tendering experience is another valuable, albeit intangible, resource type for suppliers 
competing in the public sector marketplace. In this study we hypothesise that firm size is 
associated with tendering experience. The rationale for this predicted relationship is as follows. 
Organisations that are relatively large at birth or that grow quickly in their early years enjoy 
greater longevity than their smaller counterparts (Freeman et al., 1983). By implication, larger 
organisations will have had more time to interact with public sector organisations and 
familiarise themselves with the idiosyncrasies of public sector tendering. In particular, they 
will have had longer to accumulate experience in searching, bidding for, negotiating and 
managing public sector contracts. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis.   
H1b.  There is a positive relationship between firm size and public sector tendering 
experience. 
As with human resource availability and tendering experience, we expect firm size to predict 
tendering capabilities. We consider two types of capabilities connected to public procurement. 
The first, procedural capability, signifies being able to manage the formal, regulated aspects of 
tendering and contract administration (Flynn and Davis, 2016a). Larger firms are expected to 
possess superior procedural capability. This is the result of their formalised planning, 
management and operational control systems (Chenhall, 2003). Evidence of this, Huggins and 
Weir (2012) found the firm size correlates with the sophistication of internal systems, be it in 
relation to quality accreditation, sales, new product development or intellectual property 
management. As a result, larger firms are better equipped to cope with the procedural and 
technical rigours of public sector tendering. Smaller firms typically get by with less formalised 
management control systems and rely on what Matlay (2000, p. 207) termed “incidental 
knowledge” that is situation specific and never codified or communicated internally. Their 
ability to navigate the procedural aspects of tendering is limited because of it. Thus, we offer 
the following hypothesis.   
H1c.  There is a positive relationship between firm size and procedural capability for 
tendering. 
The second capability type is relational in form. Relational capability is about firms engaging 
with public buyers and promoting themselves as value-adding supply partners (Flynn and 
Davis, 2016a; Moller and Torronen, 2003). Woldesenbet et al. (2012, p. 503) articulate it in 
terms of “a communication capability embracing the willingness and ability to make links, 
share experience and knowledge and foster trust and loyalty”. Firm size is also anticipated to 
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predict relational capability. The power and marketplace reputation of larger firms provides 
them with the means and the opportunity to seek out public buyers, build relationships with 
them and influence how they think about products and services. This is corroborated by 
findings that show larger firms possess more network capital and are skilled at leveraging it for 
value creation (Huggins and Weir, 2012). By contrast, smaller and younger firms find it 
challenging to establish communication channels with public buyers (Cabras, 2011), let alone 
exploit network capital for their commercial advantage (Woldesenbet et al., 2012). Thus, we 
offer the following hypothesis.  
H1d.  There is a positive relationship between firm size and relational capability for tendering. 
Resource base and tendering activity 
As referred to previously, RBV theory posits that resources ultimately determine the ability of 
any firm to compete and succeed in its selected marketplace (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; 
Makadok, 2001). In the words of Barney (1991, p. 101), resources are the basis on which a 
firm devises and implements its competitive strategy. This principle applies to the public sector 
marketplace the same as anywhere else. The set of resources and capabilities a firm has at its 
disposal will, in the first instance, condition its tendering activity. In this study, we examine 
two particular manifestations of tendering activity: frequency of tendering and typical value of 
contract tendered for. Frequency of tendering is a primary marker of activity in public 
procurement and has been used in several empirical studies (e.g. Reijonen et al., 2016; Tammi 
et al., 2014). The typical value of a contract tendered for can be seen as a proxy of ambition in 
the public sector marketplace.   
The resource base of the firm is expected to affect frequency of tendering in manifold ways. 
Staff availability means that firms can regularly search and tender for contracts with public 
sector organisations. This may explain why, for example, UK firms with 50 or more employees 
were found to be more than twice as likely to access public tender documentation compared to 
firms with under 50 employees (Office for National Statistics, 2012). Limited human resource 
availability is going to constrain the regularity of tendering and may force some firms to engage 
in trade-offs between public and private sector opportunities. Accumulated experience in 
public procurement provides firms with the advantage of knowing when and where to search 
for contracts, be they publicly advertised or not. Supportive of this relationship, Pickernell et 
al. (2013) demonstrated that experience is a predictor of involvement in public procurement. 
Lack of experience in public procurement inhibits involvement. For example, public tendering 
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novices do not always know where to find out about opportunities relevant to their operations 
(Greer, 1999; Loader, 2005). 
Capabilities should also influence frequency of tendering. Superior procedural capability 
implies that firms will have relatively few difficulties in understanding and responding to the 
technical and legal requirements set out in the RFT. Moreover, procedural capability implies 
tendering can be conducted in an efficient manner. The obverse is that deficiencies in 
procedural capability will stymie firms’ ability and willingness to compete for public contracts. 
Recurring complaints by firms that the public procurement system is cumbersome and opaque 
(Fee et al., 2002; Loader, 2005, 2015) allude to this very problem. Relational capability is also 
conducive to submitting tenders, albeit in a different way. Through the connections it fosters 
relational capability should lead to firms receiving invitations to tender (ITT) from buying 
organisations. Suggestive of this effect, Reijonen et al. (2016) have shown that firms with a 
proactive market orientation tender for public contracts more often. Taking these points 
together, we hypothesise the following.   
H2a.  There is a positive relationship between a firm’s resource base and its frequency of 
tendering.  
The resource base is also expected to predict the value of public contracts firms tender for. For 
one, tendering for higher value contracts entails a not insignificant amount of time, effort and 
resources. The average cost of putting together a bid in the EU is €3,200, with this figure rising 
in proportion to the complexity and value of the contract (Centre for Economic and Business 
Research, 2013). Therefore, firms need to have sufficient organisational capacity, both in 
respect of personnel and experience, when tendering for higher value contracts. Consistent with 
this argument, firm size has been shown by Flynn et al. (2015) to predict the value of contract 
pursued. This may be due to the fact that small firms’ probability of winning falls sharply once 
the contract value exceeds €60,000 (PwC, 2014). In terms of capabilities, procedural capability 
allows firms to satisfy the oftentimes stringent qualification criteria used for higher value 
contracts and to demonstrate competence for managing the contract in the event of success. 
Complementary to this, relational capability instils confidence in firms to be ambitious. This 
confidence stems from the way in which relational capability begets credibility and traction 
with procurement decision makers (Woldesenbet et al., 2012). Taking these points together, 
we hypothesise the following. 
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H2b.  There is a positive relationship between a firm’s resource base and the typical value of 
public contracts tendered for.  
 
Resource base and performance 
According to RBV theory, what resources a firm has at its disposal and how it utilises them 
determines competitive success (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). In line with 
this theoretical tenet, there is a growing body of evidence linking resources and capabilities to 
performance in public procurement. Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008) discerned a 
relationship between a firm’s perception of its legal and administrative resources and the 
likelihood of it supplying the Finnish public sector. Firm size, whether measured in revenue or 
employee numbers, has also emerged as an antecedent of success in securing public contracts 
in the UK and the USA (Pickernell et al., 2011; Temponi and Cui, 2008). Such findings should 
be seen in the context of research by Blackburn et al. (2013), which identifies age and size as 
the two principal determinants of SME performance. In reference to capabilities, we know that 
supply chain capabilities drive various measures of organisational performance, ranging from 
perceived customer value to financial results (Tracey et al., 2005). We also know that 
tendering-specific capabilities are linked to performance in public procurement (Flynn and 
Davis, 2016a) and that adhering to RFT procedures is a prerequisite for being considered for 
public contracts (Withey, 2011). Taking these points together, we hypothesise the following. 
H3a.  There is a positive relationship between a firm’s resource base and success in tendering 
for public contracts. 
Apart from success rate, the resource base of the firm is anticipated to predict the proportion 
of a firm’s total revenue that is derived from public sector tendering. Rationalising this 
predicted relationship, we make the following points. Having ample tendering resources and 
capabilities affords firms the option of maintaining a dual public-private marketplace presence. 
This should help to generate revenue from both public and private sector customers. 
Conversely, firms with few tendering resources and capabilities will struggle to gain a foothold 
in the public sector marketplace (Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008; Pickernell et al., 2011; 
Withey, 2011). Allied with the previous point, the risk averse culture and formalised processes 
that define public procurement are perceived to favour large, established suppliers (Walker and 
Preuss, 2008). This creates a dynamic in which larger firms gravitate towards opportunities in 
the public sector while smaller firms confine their efforts to the private sector. The fact that 
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large firms are universally over-represented in public procurement and small firms under-
represented seems to bear this out (House of Commons Library, 2015, PwC, 2014). Thus, we 
hypothesise the following. 
H3b. There is a positive relationship between a firm’s resource base and the proportion of 
revenue that is derived from public sector tendering.  
Research design 
The research, hypothetico-deductive in form, is motivated by a desire to better understand the 
antecedents of firm participation and performance in public procurement. A conceptual model 
informed by RBV theory was specified initially. Variables for testing were identified based on 
foregoing studies. Each variable was operationalised and included in a survey instrument. The 
survey instrument was pre-tested with ten firms that had experience of tendering for public 
contracts, which is standard practice (Dillman, 2007). No issues were raised with regard to 
understanding the questions or pre-defined response sets. Ireland was chosen as the research 
setting. The Irish marketplace for public contracts, which accounts for approximately 12 per 
cent of national GDP, has undergone a series of policy changes since 2008 (OECD, 2013). All 
of these have sought to simplify the tendering process and make it accessible to smaller and 
younger firms. As such, Ireland represents an interesting context in which to test our model.       
 
Operationalisation of variables 
Firm size can be measured in a variety of ways, including through number of employees, the 
log of number of employees, annual turnover, assets, transactions and capacity (Gooding and 
Wagner III, 1985). The approach in this study is to use the unadjusted number of employees. 
Consistent with current EU policy on definitions of firm size as enunciated in Recommendation 
2003/361/EC, the following four ranges are used: 1-9 employees (micro enterprise); 10-49 
employees (small enterprise); 50-249 employees (medium enterprise); and 250+ employees 
(large enterprise). In respect of resources, human resource availability is operationalised as the 
number of employees ordinarily involved in preparing and submitting a tender on behalf of 
their firm. Tendering experience is operationalised as the total number of years that a firm has 
been involved in competing for public sector contracts. 
Procedural and relational tendering capability constructs developed and validated by Flynn and 
Davis (2016a) are used in this study. Procedural capability has five items. These are (i) ability 
to satisfy tender qualification criteria (ii) ability to understand tender evaluation criteria (iii) 
ability to effectively respond to tender evaluation criteria (iv) ability to search contract award 
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notices and receive feedback on submitted bids and (v) ability to successfully manage an 
awarded contract. Relational capability has three items. These are (i) ability to influence buyer 
needs prior to tender (ii) ability to communicate value proposition to inform tender 
specification and (iii) ability to promote goods and services to the public sector prior to tender.  
All items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = very poor and 5 = excellent. 
Respondents had to assess their firm’s ability on each item. Principal component factor analysis 
carried out using Varimax Rotation confirmed the presence of discrete procedural and 
relational capability constructs. The factor analysis results are robust, with all eight items 
loading at 0.70 or higher. Eigenvalues for each of the two constructs are above 2.0 and the 
Cronbach Alpha scores satisfy the 0.70 threshold. Further detail on the principal component 
analysis is presented in Table I. 
<Insert Table I here> 
Frequency of tendering is measured as the total number of public sector contracts that a firm 
tendered for throughout 2014. The typical value of a public contract tendered for is measured 
by reference to six ascending financial ranges. These are (1) 0- €25,000, (2) €25,001-130,000 
(3) €130,001-250,000 (4) €250,001-500,000 (5) €500,001-1,000,000 and (6) €1,000,001+. 
Success rate in tendering is measured as the percentage of public sector contracts tendered for 
in 2014 that a firm secured. Proportion of revenue derived from public sector tendering is the 
percentage of 2014 revenue that comes from supplying public sector clients.  
The survey process    
Primary data to test the hypotheses was gathered by surveying firms. Contact details for the 
population were obtained from the registration database of e-Tenders, which is the official Irish 
government website for advertising public contracts. Firms have to register on e-Tenders in 
order to learn about and apply for current and future opportunities with the Irish public sector. 
When the research was carried out in January, 2015 there was an estimated 60,000 firms 
registered on e-Tenders. An email request to participate in the research, which contained an 
embedded hypertext link to the survey instrument, was sent to the registered representative of 
each firm. Following recommended practice, a reminder notification was issued seven days 
after the initial emailing (Dillman, 2007). The survey period lasted two weeks. Short cycle-
times are characteristic of e-surveying, as the decision to participate or not is usually taken on 
receiving the email request (Yun and Trumbo, 2000).  
Self-administered surveying 
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Self-administered surveying was the preferred approach for data collection. Principally, it 
permitted access to a large and geographically dispersed enterprise population quickly and with 
minimal outlay of resources. Self-administered surveying does come with caveats, particularly 
around common method variance (Chan, 2009). As a precaution against threats to the validity 
of the data, advice proffered by Podsakoff et al. (2003) was followed. Mainly, this involved 
only requesting information that respondents could reasonably be expected to know and willing 
to disclose, designing concise and easy to interpret scale items, limiting the total number of 
scale items to eight and ensuring that respondents could participate without having to identify 
themselves or their firm.  
Response rate  
By the end of the two-week survey period 4743 responses had been received. This represents 
a response rate of 8 per cent from the 60,000 firms that had received a request to participate. 
The data screening process identified 343 duplicate cases. This was done by examining the IP 
address of each response. Duplicate cases refer to second and subsequent responses from the 
same firm. As only one response per firm was eligible, duplicate cases were eliminated. 
Thereafter, the screening process identified 1028 substantially incomplete responses. By 
substantially incomplete is meant responses that did not progress beyond the first section of the 
questionnaire, which was concerned with firm characteristics. Their elimination left the final 
number of usable responses at 3372.  
 
Representativeness  
To test for representativeness the characteristics of early and late respondents were compared. 
The early group consisted of the first 150 firms to respond. Their responses were received 
approximately three hours after the survey was distributed. The late group consisted of the last 
150 firms to respond. Their responses were received over 10 days after initial contact, and then 
only after a reminder notification had been issued. If early and late respondents are not 
statistically different across most or all of their characteristics, then the respondent group is 
assumed to be representative of the population (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The results of 
the independent sample t-tests show that early and late respondents are not significantly 
different in respect of age (p = 0.50), tendering experience (p = 0.20), frequency of tendering 
(p = 0.47) or success rate in tendering (p = 0.59). There is a statistically significant difference 
on size (p <.01), with late respondent firms somewhat larger than early respondents. This 
notwithstanding, respondents appear to be broadly representative of the public sector 
marketplace.   
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Respondent firm profile  
Micro enterprises comprise 54.7 per cent of respondent firms, small enterprises 25.6 per cent, 
medium enterprises 12.2 per cent and large enterprises 7.5 per cent. These figures are consistent 
with what has already been established on the size composition of firms competing in the Irish 
public sector marketplace (National Procurement Service, 2012). They are also a reminder that 
the public sector marketplace has fewer smaller firms and a disproportionate number of larger 
firms relative to the enterprise population1. Reported annual revenues reveal that 64.9 per cent 
earn less than €2 million, 19.3 per cent earn between €2-10 million and the remaining 16 per 
cent earn in excess of €10 million. Approximately 36.8 per cent have been trading for 10 years 
or less as against 63.2 per cent that have been trading for more than 10 years. Just over half of 
respondent firms (52.2 per cent) place themselves in the services sector, 17.7 per cent in the 
construction sector, 11 per cent in the manufacturing sector, and the remaining 19.2 per cent 
are dispersed across other sectors. In terms of jurisdiction, 71.6 per cent are domiciled in Ireland 
and 18.4 per cent in the UK and Northern Ireland. That leaves 10 per cent of firms based outside 
of these jurisdictions. Finally, 75.3 per cent of firms compete at either local, regional or national 
level versus 24.7 per cent that are internationally oriented. Further detail on the profile of 
respondent firms is contained in Table II. 
<Insert Table II here> 
 
Tendering characteristics 
Starting with tendering resources, the average number of staff typically involved in preparing 
and submitting bids is 2.79. Average tendering experience among firms is 12.92 years. Firms 
score themselves 3.70 out of 5 on procedural capability and 2.94 out of 5 on relational 
capability. The mean number of tenders submitted by firms throughout 2014 is 9.62. The 
typical contract value that firms tender for is in the €25,001-130,000 range, as indicated by the 
mean score of 2.51 on the 1-6 scale. Success rate in tendering averages 26.12 per cent and the 
proportion of revenue derived from public sector tendering averages 23.73 per cent. Inter-
correlations between these variables are presented in Table III.  
 
                                                          
1. Micro-enterprises make up 90.7 per cent of the Irish enterprise population, small enterprises 7.7 per cent, 
medium enterprises 1.3 per cent and large enterprises 0.3 per cent, according to government statistics.  
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<Insert Table III here> 
Results 
Results for the hypotheses are described in this section. One-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) is used to test relationships between firm size and the resource and capability base 
for tendering (see Table IV). The effect of firm size on each variable (F-ratio) is reproduced, 
as are the differences in mean scores between micro, small, medium and large enterprises. For 
exploratory purposes the direct relationship between firm size and tendering activity and 
performance is also examined. The effect of the resource base of the firm on tendering activity 
and performance is then tested using linear regression models (see Table V).  
H1a states that there is a positive relationship between firm size and human resource 
availability for tendering. The effect of size on human resource availability is statistically 
significant (F (3, 3305) = 501.89, p <.001, partial η2 = .31). Human resource availability for 
tendering increases with firm size, which results in the acceptance of H1a. Differences between 
all four size groups are significant at p <.01. While micro-enterprises have, on average, 1.77 
persons available to tender, this figure rises to 3.04 for small enterprises, 4.39 for medium 
enterprises and 6.89 for large enterprises. H1b states that there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and tendering experience. The effect of size on tendering experience is also 
statistically significant (F (3, 3348) = 230.63, p <.001, partial η2 = .17). Keeping with 
predictions, the larger the firm the greater its level of tendering experience. This leads to 
acceptance of H1b. The four size groups are significantly different at p <.01. Tendering 
experience ranges from 8.55 years for micro enterprises to 28.58 years for large enterprises.  
H1c states that there is a positive relationship between firm size and procedural capability. The 
effect of size on procedural capability is statistically significant (F (3, 3048) = 83.36, p <.001, 
partial η2 = .07). Procedural capability increases with firm size, thus allowing acceptance of 
H1c. Differences between size groups are significant at p <.01, although not in the case of 
medium and large enterprises (p = .82). The mean procedural capability scores for medium 
enterprises is marginally higher than large firms: 4.09 versus 4.07. H1d states that there is a 
positive relationship between firm size and relational capability. The effect of size on relational 
capability is statistically significant (F (3, 3125) = 29.30, p <.001, partial η2 = .02). As 
relational capability is found to increase with size, going from 2.80 for micro firms to 3.36 for 
large firms, H1d is accepted. All size groups are significantly different at p <.05. 
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While not specified in the conceptual model, it is nonetheless useful to investigate how firm 
size relates to tendering activity and performance (see Table IV). The results are as follows. 
Firm size is associated with frequency of tendering (F (3, 3245) = 174.64, p < .001, partial η2 
= .13) and the typical value of the contract tendered for (F (3, 3278) = 317.72, p <.001, partial 
η2 = .22). The relationship is linear in each case: as firms increase in size they tender more 
often and for higher value contracts. Likewise, firm size is significant in respect of success in 
tendering (F (3, 3138) = 25.53, p <.001, partial η2 = .02). Notably, the mean difference between 
medium and large enterprises is not statistically significant (p = .76) and they report similar 
success rates. Lastly, firm size is statistically significant for proportion of revenue derived from 
public contracting (F (3, 3161) = 8.75, p <.001, partial η2 = .01). Unlike success rate in 
tendering, the relationship is not linear. The proportion of revenue derived from public sector 
tendering peaks with medium enterprises 30.13 per cent. Small enterprises (24.54 per cent) and 
large enterprises (25.47 per cent) are almost equidistant from this peak.   
 <Insert Table IV here> 
The second part of the results focus on the hypothesised relationships between resource base 
and tendering activity and performance. H2a predicts that the resource base of the firm is 
associated with frequency of tendering. The model is significant at p <.01 and explains 19 per 
cent of the variance. This leads to acceptance of H2a. All four predictor variables are 
statistically significant. In the case of relational capability the relationship is negative, 
indicating that firms with greater relational capability tender less frequently. Conceivably, 
firms with greater relational capability are discerning in what they tender for and only target 
opportunities which they have already discussed with public buyers. The standardised 
coefficient (Beta) scores show that human resource availability and experience matter more for 
frequency of tendering than either procedural or relational capability.  
H2b predicts that the resource base of the firm is associated with the typical value of contract 
tendered for. This model is also significant at p <.01 and accounts for 20 per cent of the 
variance. H2b is accepted. Human resources, experience and procedural capability are 
significant and positive in respect of value of contract tendered for. Relational capability is 
non-significant. As with frequency of tendering, it is human resources and experience rather 
than capabilities that primarily influence the value of contracts firms pursue.  
H3a states that there is a positive relationship between the resource base and success in 
tendering. This model is significant at p <.01 and explains 9 per cent of the variance. This lends 
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support to H3a. All four resource and capability predictors are significant. It is procedural and 
relational capability rather than human resources and experience that yield the greater effect 
on success rate. The Beta scores for the former are .14 and .15 respectively. Finally, H3b states 
that there is a positive relationship between the resource base of the firm and proportion of 
revenue attributable to public sector tendering. This model is significant at p <.01 and accounts 
for 6 per cent of the variance. H3b is accepted. Experience and procedural capability are 
positive and significant predictors of the proportion of revenue, with procedural capability 
having the slightly larger effect of the two. Human resources and relational capability are non-
significant.     
<Insert Table V here> 
To summarise, the results show quite conclusively that firm size matters when explaining 
firms’ ability to tender for public contracts. As firms increase in size they have more human 
resources, experience and procedural and relational capabilities for tendering. Stocks of 
resources and capabilities, in turn, affect tendering activity and performance outcomes. The 
pattern is one in which resources enable firms to tender more often and for higher value 
contracts whereas capabilities prove decisive in winning contracts tendered for. The influence 
of size on tendering resources and capabilities is not as simple as disadvantaged SMEs versus 
advantaged large enterprises. Medium enterprises, which are the biggest in size of the SME 
family, possess the same level of procedural capability and perform comparably to large 
enterprises. The SME sub-groups of micro, small and medium enterprises are a heterogeneous 
family as regards their resource base and, thereafter, their tendering activity and performance. 
This underscores the relative rather than absolute nature of their disadvantage against large 
firms. The next section takes up each of these points in more detail. 
Discussion 
Firm size has always been at the core of debate on supplier involvement in public procurement. 
Early studies in this field were pre-occupied with the difficulties inherent in being a small 
supplier and sought to identify the internal and external barriers affecting them (e.g. Greer, 
1999; Loader, 2005; MacManus, 1991). In the years since, the narrative of disadvantaged small 
firms versus dominant large firms has become pervasive in both research and policy. Yet as 
has been argued elsewhere, such binary distinctions are not exactly helpful when they imply 
that SMEs are uniformly disadvantaged in public procurement (Flynn et al., 2015) or in any 
other marketplace for that matter (Pett et al., 2012). To help in moving beyond this point our 
paper has taken a more fine-grained perspective on firm size and involvement in public 
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procurement. It anchors its ideas in RBV theory, which adds explanatory depth to this line of 
inquiry.   
First, our results demonstrate that the bigger the firm the better resourced it is to tender for 
public contracts, which is consistent with foregoing research into tendering resources 
specifically (Flynn et al., 2015; Karjalainen and Kemppainen, 2008; Temponi and Cui, 2008) 
and organisational capital generally (Huggins and Weir, 2012). As well as being endowed with 
greater tendering resources, we show that larger firms are more adept at leveraging their 
resources in pursuit of public sector contracts. In other words, their tendering-specific 
capabilities are superior. It is interesting to note that all firm sizes rank themselves lower on 
relational capability than procedural capability. No doubt this is a consequence of the arms-
length nature of public sector tendering (Lian and Liang, 2004) and the inevitable obstacles 
this poses for firms in nurturing relationships with public buyers and persuading them as to the 
merits of their products and services (Cabras, 2011; Woldesenbet et al., 2012). RBV theory 
assumes that the quantity and quality of resources varies across the enterprise population. We 
show that this assumption is true not only for SMEs versus large enterprises but also for micro 
versus small versus medium enterprises.      
Thereafter, our results demonstrate that the superior complement of resources and capabilities 
of larger firms have a salutary effect on tendering activity and performance. This is consistent 
with RBV theory and its explanation of firm performance. As RBV contends, heterogeneity of 
firm assets accounts for what strategies firms implement and if these strategies deliver a 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). In the context of 
public procurement, we find that resources and capabilities yield different effects. Resources 
appear to enable firms to tender more frequently and for higher value contracts, which is similar 
to what Karjalainen and Kemppainen (2008) found on the relationship between resources and 
likelihood of supplying the public sector. Tendering capabilities, on the other hand, are more 
deterministic of success in tendering. This reinforces what has already been reported in the 
literature on the link between capabilities and performance (Flynn and Davis, 2016a; Tracey et 
al., 2005; Withey, 2011).  
As asserted at the outset, there has been a tendency to assume that SMEs are homogeneous as 
regards their attributes, behaviours, and even experienced outcomes in public procurement 
(Flynn et al., 2015). The reality, as illustrated here, is that there are pronounced resource and 
capability gaps between the SME sub-groups, but especially between micro and medium 
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enterprises. By way of illustration, medium enterprises have twice the number of personnel for 
tendering compared to micro enterprises and over twice the amount of public procurement 
experience. These resource and capability gaps help explain why, for example, micro 
enterprises tender for 4.8 contracts per year, small enterprises 11.41 and medium enterprises 
19.66 and why win rates range from 22 per cent for micro enterprises to 34 per cent for medium 
enterprises. In some respects medium enterprises are closer to large enterprises than the other 
two size groups with whom they share the SME designation. Proof of this, they report 
marginally higher levels of procedural capability, enjoy comparable success rates, and generate 
more revenue from public contracting than large enterprises. In this sense, SME disadvantage 
in public procurement is less black and white than shades of grey. 
Implications for practice   
In addition to its scholarly contribution, our research has implications for practice. First, current 
“one-size-fits-all” SME-friendly government policy requires re-assessment. Considering that 
micro, small and medium enterprises vary in their tendering resources and capabilities, the 
level of support they require and the type of actions that stand to benefit them are also likely to 
vary. In recognition of this, bespoke interventions for the group most in need of assistance, 
micro enterprises, may be justified, particularly as they number nine out of ten SMEs in the 
EU. Something similar has already been mooted by Loader and Norton (2015) in their 
recommendation that generic SME-friendly policy should be accompanied by sector-specific 
initiatives and that public buyers be granted discretion over how they implement it. As for 
medium enterprises, given the commonalities that exist between them and large enterprises it 
is questionable as to whether they need or deserve support. Going forward, it may be 
appropriate for policy makers and legislators to think in terms of micro and small enterprises 
(MSEs) rather than SMEs when it comes to widening access to public procurement.    
Second, and following on from the previous point, public buyers are encouraged to ensure that 
contract competitions are not only SME-friendly but also micro and small enterprise-friendly 
(Flynn and Davis, 2016b). Inter alia, this means minimising the opportunity cost of tendering 
in view of the comparatively fewer staff and experience that these two SME sub-groups have 
available to them. Third, managers of micro and small enterprises are advised to enhance their 
tendering capabilities as they lag medium and large enterprises. Various strategies can be 
considered here. These include: recruiting individuals who can bring with them bridging and 
networking capabilities (Woldesenbet et al., 2012); collaborating with external partners known 
to possess specific capabilities lacking in the focal firm (Whittaker et al., 2016); and making 
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learning processes “intentional” so that knowledge is retained and capabilities developed 
within the organisation (Matlay, 2000, p. 208).  
 
Limitations and future research 
There are limitations to our study, which we acknowledge. The treatment of resources and 
capabilities is not exhaustive. Future research may wish to take account of additional resources 
e.g. use of external consultants, IT infrastructure and other capabilities e.g. production, 
delivery, process innovation (Moller and Torronen, 2003). It may also be useful to examine not 
only tendering activity but also the regularity with which firms search for available contracts, 
as Reijonen et al. (2016) did. Furthermore, performance could be examined at different levels 
of the public sector e.g. central government versus local government. Another limitation 
concerns our reliance on firm size as the sole discriminating factor. While firm size is a primary 
determinant of productivity and performance (Blackburn et al., 2013; Gooding and Wagner III, 
1985), other factors such as owner-manager traits, growth intentions and geographic location 
are also deserving of empirical scrutiny (Pickernell et al., 2011). Finally, the results are based 
on survey data obtained from firms competing for public contracts in Ireland. Replicating this 
research design, or similar, in another institutional setting would allow cross-national 
comparisons to be made.     
Conclusion 
Promoting SME involvement in public sector supply chains has become a mainstay of 
government policy internationally and a topic round which much procurement research has 
coalesced (Flynn and Davis, 2016b; Kidalov and Snider, 2011). Still, there remains a paucity 
of empirical evidence and theorising on the precise relationship between firm size and ability 
and willingness to tender for public contracts. Our study offers a more penetrating analysis of 
this relationship by comparing the resources and capabilities of micro, small, medium and large 
enterprises and how these, in turn, affect tendering activity and performance. It does so through 
the lens of RBV of the firm, which brings some theoretical grounding to the problem. Its 
findings point to the desirability of moving beyond SME versus large firm distinctions and 
instead embracing a more layered, nuanced understanding of firm size and its effects. This has 
direct implications for how firm involvement in public procurement is investigated as well as 
how public policy is formulated and implemented. There is a need for more research in this 
area. With this in mind, a number of actionable recommendations to steer future inquiry are set 
forth.   
20 
 
 
References 
Amit, R. and Schoemaker, P.J.H. (1993), “Strategic assets and organisational rent”, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 33-46.  
Armstrong, J.S. and Overton, T.S. (1977), “Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 396-402.  
Barney, J. (1991), “Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage”, Journal of 
Management, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp.99-120. 
Blackburn, R., Hart, M. and Wainwright, T. (2013), “Small business performance: business, 
strategy and owner-manager characteristics”, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 8-27. 
Cabras, I. (2011), “Mapping the spatial patterns of public procurement: a case study from a 
peripheral local authority in Northern England”, International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 187-205. 
Centre for Economic and Business Research (2013), “UK e-Procurement Trends”, available 
at: http://gatewit.com/en/resources/registo.php?id=45 (accessed 21 January 2015).   
Chan, D. (2009), “So why ask me? Are self-report data really that bad?”, in Lance, C.E. and 
Vandenberg, R.J. (Eds), Statistical and Methodological Myths and Urban Legends, Routledge, 
New York, NY, pp. 309-336. 
Chenhall, R.H. (2003), “Management control systems design within its organisational Context: 
findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future”, Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, Vol. 28 No. 2/3, pp. 127-168.  
Dillman, D.A. (2007), “Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method”, 2nd ed., 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ. 
European Commission (2008), “European code of best practices facilitating access by SMEs 
to public procurement contracts”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/sme_code_of_best_practices_en.
pdf (accessed 4 June 2012). 
Fee, R., Erridge, A. and Hennigan, S. (2002), “SMEs and government purchasing in Northern 
Ireland”, European Business Review, Vol. 14 No. 5, pp. 326-334. 
Flynn, A., McKevitt, D. and Davis, P. (2015), “The impact of size on SME public sector 
tendering”, International Small Business Journal, Vol. 33 No. 4, pp. 443-461.    
Flynn, A. and Davis, P. (2016a), “Investigating the effect of tendering capabilities on SME 
activity and performance in public contract competitions”, International Small Business 
Journal, doi: 10.1177/0266242616630035.  
Flynn, A. and Davis, P. (2016b), "Firms’ experience of SME-friendly policy and their 
participation and success in public procurement", Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 616-635. 
Freeman, J., Carroll, G.R. and Hannan, M.T. (1983), “The liability of newness: age dependence 
in organisational death rates”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48 No. 5, pp. 692-710.  
21 
 
Georghiou, L., Edler, J., Uyarra, E. and Yeow, J. (2014), “Policy instruments for public 
procurement of innovation: choice, design and assessment”, Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change, Vol. 86 No. 1, pp.1-12. 
Gooding, R.Z. and Wagner, J.A. (1985), “A meta-analytic review of the relationship between 
size and performance: the productivity and efficiency of organisations and their subunits”, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 462-481. 
Greer, H. (1999), “Small firms and public procurement in Ireland: a study for the department 
of enterprise, trade and employment”, Network Resources Limited, UK. 
House of Commons Library (2015), Briefing paper: public procurement, available at:  
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06029#fullreport 
(accessed 22 January 2017). 
Huggins, R. and Weir, M. (2012), “Intellectual assets and small knowledge-intensive business 
service firms”, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 92–
113. 
Karjalainen, K. and Kemppainen, K. (2008), “The involvement of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in public procurement: impact of resource perceptions, electronic systems and 
enterprise size”, Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 230-40. 
Kidalov, M.V. and Snider, K.F. (2011), “US and European public procurement policies for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SME): a comparative perspective”, Business and Politics, 
Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 1-43.   
Knutsson, H. and Thomasson, A. (2014), “Innovation in the public procurement process: A 
study of the creation of innovation-friendly public procurement”, Public Management 
Review, Vol. 16 (2), pp. 242-255. 
Lian, P.C.S. and Laing, A.W. (2004), “Public sector purchasing of health services: a 
comparison with private sector purchasing”, Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 
Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 247-256. 
Loader, K. (2005), “Supporting SMEs through government purchasing activity”, The 
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 17-26. 
Loader, K. (2013), “Is public procurement a successful small business policy support? A 
review of the evidence”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol. 31 No. 
1, pp. 39-55.  
Loader, K. (2015), “SME suppliers and the challenge of public procurement: evidence revealed 
by a UK government online feedback facility”, Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 103-112. 
Loader, K. and Norton, S. (2015), “SME access to public procurement. An analysis of the 
experiences of SMEs supplying the publicly funded UK heritage sector”, Journal of 
Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 241-250. 
MacManus, S. (1991), “Why businesses are reluctant to sell to government?”, Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 51 No. 4, pp. 328-344. 
Makadok, R. (2001), “Towards a synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic-capability views 
of rent creation”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22 No. 5, pp. 387-401. 
22 
 
Matlay, H. (2000), “Organisational learning in small learning organisations: an empirical 
overview”, Education+ Training, Vol. 42 No. 4/5, pp. 202-211. 
Moller, K.E. and Torronen, P. (2003), “Business suppliers’ value creation potential: a 
capability-based analysis”, Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 109-118.  
National Procurement Service (2012), “Opportunities in public sector procurement: the 
national procurement service annual survey 2012”, available at: 
https://www.procurement.ie/news/1710 (accessed 14 June 2014).   
OECD (2013), “Government at a glance 2013: procurement data”, available at: 
http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4213201e.pdf?expires=1457615797&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=08034536CF468AD5353E82D5C2983E33 (accessed 9 March 2015).    
Office for National Statistics (2012), “E-commerce and ICT activity, 2011, available at: 
http://www.sfa.ie/Sectors/SF/SFA.nsf/vPages/News~sfa-concerns-over-access-to-public-
contracts-06-05-2013?OpenDocument (accessed 18 January 2015).  
Penrose, E.T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford University Press, London. 
Pett, T., Wolff, J. and Sie, L. (2012), “SME identity and homogeneity – are there meaningful 
differences between micro, small and medium-sized enterprises?”, Journal of Marketing 
Development and Competitiveness, Vol. 6 No. 2, 48-59. 
Pickernell, D., Kay, A., Packham, G. and Miller, C. (2011), “Competing agendas in public 
procurement: an empirical analysis of opportunities and limits in the UK for SMEs”, 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 641-58. 
Pickernell, D., Senyard, D., Jones, P., Packham, G. and Ramsey, E. (2013), “New and young 
firms: entrepreneurship policy and the role of government – evidence from the federation of 
small businesses survey”, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 29 No. 
2, pp. 358-382.  
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee J.Y. and Podsakoff, N.P. (2003), “Common method 
biases in behavioral research: a critical review of the literature and recommended remedies”, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 88 No. 5, pp. 879-903.    
PwC (2014), “SMEs' access to public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the 
EU”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/smes-access-
and-aggregation-of-demand_en.pdf (accessed 10 December 2015).  
Reijonen, H., Tammi, T. and Saastamoinen, J. (2016), “SMEs and public sector procurement: 
does entrepreneurial orientation make a difference?”, International Small Business Journal, 
Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 468-486.   
Sharfman, M.P., Wolf, G., Chase, R.B. and Tansik, D.A. (1988), “Antecedents of 
organisational slack”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13 No. 4, pp. 601-614. 
Tammi, T., Saastamoinen, J. and Reijonen, H. (2014), “Market orientation and SMEs’ activity 
in public sector procurement participation”, Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 
304-327.  
23 
 
Temponi, C. and Cui, W. (2008), “Factors impacting participation of Hispanic small businesses 
in government contracting in the USA”, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 504-526. 
Tracey, M., Lim, J. S. and Vonderembse, M.A. (2005), “The impact of supply-chain 
management capabilities on business performance”, Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 179-191.    
Walker, H. and Preuss, L. (2008), “Fostering sustainability through sourcing from small 
businesses: public sector perspectives”, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 16 No. 15, pp. 
1600-1609. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984), “A resource‐based view of the firm”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 171-180. 
Withey, J.J. (2011), “Small manufacturing businesses: their interest in securing contracts from 
public agencies”, Journal of Public Procurement, Vol. 11 No. 3, p. 388-402. 
Whittaker, D.H., Fath, B.P. and Fiedler, A. (2016), “Assembling capabilities for innovation: 
Evidence from New Zealand SMEs”, International Small Business Journal, Vol. 34 No. 1, pp. 
123-143. 
Woldesenbet, K., Ram, M. and Jones, T. (2012), “Supplying large firms: the role of 
entrepreneurial and dynamic capabilities in small businesses”, International Small Business 
Journal, Vol. 30 No. 5, pp. 493-512. 
Yun, G.W. and Trumbo, C.W. (2000), “Comparative response to a survey executed by post, e‐
mail, & web form”, Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, Vol. 6 No. 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
Table I. Principal component analysis 
a
 KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.84. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity p < .001 (χ = 6988.22).    
b KMO Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.74. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity p < .001 (χ = 4859.57).   
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Procedural capability a .85 3.18 63.64%    
Ability to satisfy tender qualification criteria     .80 .64 3.75 
Ability to understand tender evaluation criteria     .84 .71 3.60 
Ability to effectively respond to tender evaluation criteria    .89 .80 3.70 
Ability to search contract award notices and receive feedback on submitted bids     .70 .49 3.18 
Ability to successfully manage an awarded contract      .72 .52 4.28 
 
      
Relational capability b .87 2.40 80.05%    
Ability to influence buyer needs prior to tender    .90 .82 2.71 
Ability to communicate value proposition to inform tender specification     .88 .78 3.16 
Ability to promote goods and services to public sector prior to tender    .89 .79 2.95 
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Table II. Respondent firm characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm size % Sector % 
Micro 
Small 
Medium 
Large  
54.7 
25.6 
12.2 
7.5 
Manufacturing 
Services (Professional & Retail) 
Construction 
All other 
11 
52.2 
17.7 
19.1 
 
Annual turnover € % Jurisdiction % 
< 2 million 
2-10 million 
10-50 million 
50+ million 
64.9 
19.3 
9.6 
6.3 
Ireland 
UK & Northern Ireland 
Rest of Europe 
Rest of World 
71.6 
18.4 
5.9 
4.1 
 
Age % Market focus  
0-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-20 years 
21+ years 
20.6 
16.2 
25.8 
37.4 
Local 
Regional 
National  
International 
13.6 
15.6 
46.2 
24.3 
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Table III. Correlations 
 Firm 
size 
Human 
resources for 
tendering 
Experience in 
tendering 
Procedural 
capability 
Relational 
capability 
Frequency of 
tendering 
Contract 
value  
Success rate 
in tendering 
Revenue 
from public 
sector 
Firm size 1         
Human 
resources for 
tendering 
.55** 1        
Experience in 
tendering 
.41** .37** 1       
Procedural 
capability 
.26** .22** .20** 1      
Relational 
capability 
.16** .18** .13** .53** 1     
Frequency of 
tendering 
.37** .31** .39** .18** .06** 1    
Contract value  .39** .39** .30** .22** .13** .23** 1   
Success rate in 
tendering 
.15** .13** .15** .25** .25** .11** .08** 1  
Revenue from 
public sector 
.07** .11** .18** .21** .14** .30** .18** .42** 1 
**p <.01 
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Table IV. ANOVA results of group differences 
a
 All groups statistically different. 
b
 Micro enterprises statistically different from all other groups. 
c
 Small enterprises statistically different from all other groups. 
d
 No statistical difference between medium and large enterprises. 
e All groups statistically different except small and large enterprises.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Micro 
(1-9 
employees) 
n = 1835 
Small 
(10-49 
employees) 
n = 857 
Medium 
(50-249 
employees) 
n = 408 
Large 
(250+ 
employees) 
n = 252 
Population 
average 
Tendering Resources      
Human resources for tendering 1.77 a 3.04 a 4.39 a 6.89 a 2.79 
Experience in tendering 8.55 a 14.18 a 20.35 a 28.58 a 12.92 
      
Tendering Capabilities      
Procedural capability 3.51 b 3.84 c 4.09 d 4.07 d 3.70 
Relational capability 2.80 a 3.02 a 3.17 a 3.36 a 2.94 
      
Tendering Activity      
Frequency of tendering 4.80 a 11.41 a 19.66 a 24.32 a 9.62 
Contract value  1.96 a 2.72 a 3.56 a 4.09 a 2.51 
      
Performance       
Success rate in tendering 22.11% b 28.59% c 34.34% d 35.16% d 26.12% 
Revenue from public sector 21.77% e 24.54% e 30.13% e 25.47% e 23.73% 
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Table V. Predictive tests 
 Frequency of tendering Contract value Success rate in tendering Revenue from public sector  
Human resources for tendering .18** (.12) .31** (.01) .04* (.24) .01 (.23) 
Experience in tendering .30** (.02) .16** (.00)  .08** (.04) .13** (.04) 
Procedural capability .12** (.41) .12** (.03) .14** (.81) .16** (.77) 
Relational capability -.07** (.31) -.01 (.02) .15** (.63) .03 (.60) 
n 2952a 2975a 2877a 2899a 
Constant -3.30** (1.30) 9.19** (.11) -4.52** (2.56) -1.74** (2.46) 
F 182.39 190.19 76.46 50.39 
Adjusted R Square .19 .20 .09 .06 
The standard error is in parentheses.  
a
 Does not equal group total, 3372, due to missing values. 
**p <.01 *p <.05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
